On Bayes' theorem for improper mixtures by McCullagh, Peter & Han, Han
ar
X
iv
:1
11
2.
32
28
v1
  [
ma
th.
ST
]  
14
 D
ec
 20
11
The Annals of Statistics
2011, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2007–2020
DOI: 10.1214/11-AOS892
c© Institute of Mathematical Statistics, 2011
ON BAYES’ THEOREM FOR IMPROPER MIXTURES1
By Peter McCullagh and Han Han
University of Chicago
Although Bayes’s theorem demands a prior that is a probabil-
ity distribution on the parameter space, the calculus associated with
Bayes’s theorem sometimes generates sensible procedures from im-
proper priors, Pitman’s estimator being a good example. However,
improper priors may also lead to Bayes procedures that are para-
doxical or otherwise unsatisfactory, prompting some authors to insist
that all priors be proper. This paper begins with the observation that
an improper measure on Θ satisfying Kingman’s countability condi-
tion is in fact a probability distribution on the power set. We show
how to extend a model in such a way that the extended parame-
ter space is the power set. Under an additional finiteness condition,
which is needed for the existence of a sampling region, the conditions
for Bayes’s theorem are satisfied by the extension. Lack of interfer-
ence ensures that the posterior distribution in the extended space is
compatible with the original parameter space. Provided that the key
finiteness condition is satisfied, this probabilistic analysis of the ex-
tended model may be interpreted as a vindication of improper Bayes
procedures derived from the original model.
1. Introduction. Consider a parametric model consisting of a family of
probability distributions {Pθ} indexed by the parameter θ ∈Θ. Each Pθ is
a probability distribution on the observation space S1, usually a product
space such as Rn. In the parametric application of Bayes’s theorem, the
family {Pθ} is replaced by a single probability distribution Ppi(dθ, dy) =
Pθ(dy)pi(dθ) on the product space Θ × S1. The associated projections are
the prior pi on the parameter space and the marginal distribution
Ppi(Θ×A) =
∫
Θ
Pθ(A)pi(dθ)
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for A ⊂ S1. To each observation, y ∈ S1 there corresponds a conditional
distribution Ppi(dθ | y), also called the posterior distribution, on Θ.
The joint distribution Ppi(dθ, dy) has a dual interpretation. The generative
interpretation begins with θ, a random element drawn from Θ with probabil-
ity distribution pi, the second component being distributed according to the
model distribution Y ∼ Pθ, now treated as a conditional distribution given θ.
In reverse order, the inferential interpretation begins with the observational
component Y ∼ Ppi(Θ × dy) drawn from the mixture distribution, the pa-
rameter component being distributed as θ ∼ Ppi(· | y) from the conditional
distribution given Y = y. The conditional distribution Ppi(· | y) tells us how
to select θ ∈Θ in order that the joint distribution should coincide with the
given joint distribution Ppi(dθ, dy).
On the assumption that the marginal measure Pν(dy) =
∫
ΘPθ(dy)ν(dθ)
is σ-finite, formal application of the Bayes calculus with an improper prior ν
yields a posterior distribution Q(dθ | y) satisfying
Pθ(dy)ν(dθ) = Pν(dy)Q(dθ | y)
[Eaton (1982), Eaton and Sudderth (1995)]. This factorization of the joint
measure yields a conditional law that is a probability distribution, in the
sense that Q(Θ | y) = 1. However, the joint measure is not a probability
distribution, so the factorization is not to be confused with Bayes’s theo-
rem: it does not offer a probabilistic interpretation of Q(· | y) as a family
of conditional distributions generated by a joint probability distribution on
the product space. As a result, some authors reject the Kolmogorov axiom
of total probability, arguing instead for a nonunitary measure theory for
Bayesian applications [Hartigan (1983), Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2010)].
The goal of this paper is to show how an improper prior may be accom-
modated within the standard unitary theory without deviation from the
Kolmogorov axioms. A probability space is constructed from the improper
measure in such a way that Q(· | y) admits a probabilistic interpretation
as a family of conditional probability distributions given the observation.
Section 6 shows that σ-finiteness is not needed.
It would be inappropriate here to offer a review of the vast literature on
improper priors, most of which is not relevant to the approach taken here.
Nonetheless, a few remarks are in order. Some statisticians clearly have
qualms about the use of such priors, partly because Bayes’s theorem de-
mands that priors be proper, partly because the “degree of belief” interpre-
tation is no longer compelling, and partly because the formal manipulation
of improper priors may lead to inferential paradoxes of the sort discussed
by Dawid, Stone and Zidek (1973). Lindley (1973) argues correctly that
strict adherence to the rules of probability requires all priors to be proper.
Even though the Bayes calculus often generates procedures yielding sensi-
ble conclusions, he concludes that improper priors must be rejected. Many
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statisticians, including some who interpret the prior as a “degree of belief,”
are inclined to take a less dogmatic view. In connection with Bernoulli trials,
Bernardo and Smith (1994) (Section 5.2) comment as follows. It is impor-
tant to recognize, however, that this is merely an approximation device and
in no way justifies [the improper limit θ−1(1− θ)−1] as having any special
significance as a representation of “prior ignorance.” In subsequent discus-
sion in Section 5.4, they take a more pragmatic view of a reference prior as
a mathematical tool generating a reference analysis by the Bayes calculus.
The purpose of this note is to offer a purely probabilistic interpretation
of an improper prior, in agreement with Lindley’s thesis but not with his
conclusion. The interpretation that removes the chief mathematical obsta-
cle is that an improper measure on Θ is a probability distribution on the
set of subsets of Θ. A proper prior determines a random element θ ∈ Θ
with distribution pi, whereas an improper prior ν determines a random sub-
set, a countable collection {θi} distributed as a Poisson process with mean
measure ν. In the product space Θ × S1, the proper joint distribution Ppi
determines a random element (θ,Y ), whereas the improper distribution Pν
determines a random subset Z ⊂ Θ× S1, a countable collection of ordered
pairs Z = {(θi, Yi)}. An observation on a point process consists of a sam-
pling region A ⊂ S1 together with the set y = Y ∩A of events that occur
in A. It is critical that the sampling region be specified in such a way that
Y ∩A is finite, a condition that puts definite limits on ν and on the set of
sampling schemes. Having done so, we obtain the conditional distribution
given the observation. The standard Bayesian argument associates with each
point y ∈ S1 a probability distribution on Θ: the point process argument as-
sociates with each finite subset y ⊂ A a probability distribution on Θ#y.
Despite this fundamental distinction, certain aspects of the conditional dis-
tribution are in accord with the formal application of the Bayes calculus,
treating the mixture as if it were a model for a random element rather than
a random subset.
2. Conditional distributions. Consider a Poisson process with mean mea-
sure µ in the product space S = S0×S1. Existence of the process is guaran-
teed if the singletons of S are contained in the σ-field, and µ is a countable
sum of finite measures, that is,
µ=
∞∑
n=1
µn where µn(S)<∞.(2.1)
Kingman’s countability condition, also called weak finiteness [Kingman
(1993)], is the natural condition for existence because it implies that the
marginal measures µ0(B) = µ(B × S1) for B ⊂ S0 and µ1(A) = µ(S0 × A)
for A ⊂ S1 are countable. Consequently, the projected processes exist and
are also Poisson.
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Unlike σ-finiteness, countability does not imply the existence of a subset
A⊂ S such that 0< µ(A)<∞. If such a set exists, the process is said to be
observable on A. For example, the measure taking the value ∞ on subsets
of positive Lebesgue measure in R and zero otherwise is countable, but
the process is not observable on any subset. Sigma-finiteness is a stronger
condition, sufficient for existence but not necessary, and not inherited by
the projected marginal measures [Kingman (1993)].
The symbol Z ∼ PP(µ) denotes a Poisson point process, which is a random
subset Z ⊂S such that for each finite collection of disjoint subsets A1, . . . ,An
of S , the random variables #(Z ∩A1), . . . ,#(Z ∩An) are distributed inde-
pendently according to the Poisson distribution #(Z ∩Aj)∼Po(µ(Aj)). In
much of what follows, it is assumed that µ(S) =∞, which implies that
#Z ∼ Po(∞) is infinite with probability one, but countable on account
of (2.1). Since Z is countable and S is a product set, we may label the
events
Z = (X,Y ) = {(Xi, Yi) : i= 1,2, . . .},
where X ⊂ S0 is a Poisson process with mean measure µ0 and Y ⊂ S1 is
a Poisson process with mean measure µ1. The notation Z = (X,Y ) implies
that X ⊂S0 and Y ⊂ S1 are countable subsets whose elements are in a spe-
cific 1–1 correspondence.
To say what is meant by an observation on a point process, we must
first establish the sampling protocol, which is a test set or sampling region
A⊂ S1 such that µ1(A)<∞. In this scheme, S0 is the domain of inference,
so X is not observed. The actual observation is the test set A together with
the random subset y= Y ∩A, which is finite with probability one. Although
we refer to S1 as the “space of observations,” it must be emphasized that
an observation is not a random element in S1, but a finite random subset
y⊂A⊂S1, which could be empty.
The distinction between a point process and an observation on the process
is the same as the distinction between an infinite process and an observa-
tion on that process. An infinite process is a sequence of random variables
Y = (Y1, Y2, . . .) indexed by the natural numbers, that is, a random function
Y :N→ R. An observation consists of a sample, a finite subset A ⊂ N, to-
gether with the response values Y [A] for the sampled units. Likewise, a point
process is a random subset considered as a random function Y :S1→{0,1}
indexed by the domain S1. An observation consists of a sample or sampling
region A⊂ S1 together with the restriction Y [A] = Y ∩A of the process to
the sample. Usually A is not finite or even countable, but the observation is
necessarily finite in the sense that #(Y ∩A)<∞.
Whether we are talking of sequences or point processes, the domain of
inference is not necessarily to be interpreted as a parameter space: in cer-
tain applications discussed below, the observation space consists of finite
sequences in S1 = R
n, and S0 = R
∞ is the set of subsequent trajectories.
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In this sense, predictive sample-space inferences are an integral part of the
general theory (Section 4.2).
We focus here on inferences for the X-values associated with the events
y= Y ∩A that occur in the sampling region, that is, the subset
x=X[A] = {Xi :Yi ∈A}= {Xi :Yi ∈ y}
in 1–1 correspondence with the observation y. In this formal sense, an in-
ference is a rule associating with each finite subset y ⊂ A a probability
distribution on S#y0 .
Clearly, if y is empty, x is also empty, so the conditional distribution is
trivial, putting probability one on the event that x is empty. Without loss
of generality, therefore, we assume that 0 < µ1(A) <∞, that m = #y is
positive and finite, and that the events are labeled (Y1, . . . , Ym) by a uni-
form random permutation independent of Z. Given #y = m, the pairs
(X1, Y1), . . . , (Xm, Ym) are independent and identically distributed random
variables with probability density µ(dxdy)/µ1(A) in S0×A. Thus, the con-
ditional joint density given Y ∩A= y is equal to
p(dx | y) =
m∏
i=1
µ(dxidyi)
µ1(dyi)
=
m∏
i=1
µ(dxi | yi),(2.2)
where µ(dx | y) is the limiting ratio µ(dx× dy)/µ1(dy) as dy ↓ {y}.
The key properties of this conditional distribution are twofold, condi-
tional independence and lack of interference. First, the random variables
X1, . . . ,Xm are conditionally independent given Y ∩A= y. Second, the con-
ditional distribution of Xi given y depends only on Yi, not on the number
or position of other events in A. For example, if two or more events occur
at the same point (Yi = Yj) the random variables Xi,Xj are conditionally
independent and identically distributed given y. The test set determines
the events on which predictions are made, but beyond that it has no effect.
In particular, if m= 1, the conditional density of X is p(dx | y)∝ µ(dx | y)
regardless of the test set.
The observability assumption µ1(A)<∞ is not made out of concern for
what might reasonably be expected of an observer in the field. On the con-
trary, finiteness is essential to the mathematical argument leading to (2.2). If
the number of events were infinite, countability implies that the values can
be labeled sequentially y1, y2, . . . in 1–1 correspondence with the integers.
Countability does not imply that they can be labeled in such a way that the
infinite sequence is exchangeable. As a result, the factorization (2.2) fails if
#y=∞.
The remark made above, that the test set has no effect on inferences,
is correct but possibly misleading. Suppose that 0 <m <∞ and that the
observation consists of that information alone without recording the par-
ticular values. If µ1(A) = 0 or µ1(A) =∞, no inference is possible beyond
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the fact that the model is totally incompatible with the observation. If the
marginal measure is finite on A, the conditional density is such that the
components of X[A] are independent and identically distributed with den-
sity µ(dx×A)/µ1(A), which does depend on the choice of test set. In the
context of parametric mixture models with Θ≡S0, each sequence with dis-
tribution Pθ has probability Pθ(A) of being recorded. Thus, before obser-
vation begins, the restriction to A⊂ S1 effectively changes the measure to
Pθ(A)ν(dθ), which is finite on Θ, but depends on the choice of A.
3. Improper mixtures. Consider a parametric statistical model consist-
ing of a family of probability distributions {Pθ: θ ∈ Θ} on the observation
space S1, one distribution for each point θ in the parameter space. Each
model distribution determines a random element Y ∼ Pθ. A probability dis-
tribution pi on Θ completes the Bayesian specification, and each Bayesian
model also determines a random element (θ,Y ) ∈ Θ × S1 distributed as
pi(dθ)Pθ(dy). The observational component is a random element Y ∈ S1 dis-
tributed as the mixture Y ∼ Ppi, and the conditional distribution given Y = y
is formally the limit of pi(dθ)Pθ(dy)/Ppi(Θ, dy) as dy ↓ {y}.
A countable measure ν such that ν(Θ) =∞ does not determine a random
element θ ∈ Θ, but it does determine an infinite random subset X ⊂ Θ.
Furthermore, the joint measure ν(dθ)Pθ(dy) is countable, so there exists
a random subset Z = (X,Y )⊂Θ×S1, distributed according to the Poisson
process with mean measure ν(dθ)Pθ(dy). If this interpretation is granted,
it is necessary first to specify the sampling region A ⊂ S1, in such a way
that Pν(A)<∞ to ensure that only finitely many events y = Y ∩A occur
in A. To each observed event Yi ∈ y, there corresponds a parameter point
θi ∈X[A] such that (θi, Yi) ∈ Z. Parametric inference consists in finding the
joint conditional distribution given Y ∩ A = y of the particular subset of
parameter values θ1, . . . , θm corresponding to the events observed.
This probabilistic interpretation forces us to think of the parameter and
the observation in a collective manner, as sets rather than points. Taken lit-
erally, the improper mixture is not a model for a random element in Θ×S1,
but a model for a random subset Z = (X,Y )⊂Θ× S1. If ν(Θ)<∞, as in
a proper mixture, it is sufficient to take A = S1 and to record the entire
subset y⊂ S1, which is necessarily finite. However, if ν(Θ) =∞, it is neces-
sary to sample the process by first establishing a test set A⊂ S1 such that
Pν(A) <∞, and then listing the finite set of values y = Y ∩A that occur
in A. Generally speaking, this finiteness condition rules out many sampling
schemes that might otherwise seem reasonable. In the special case where
#y= 1, X[A] is a random subset consisting of a single point, whose condi-
tional density at x ∈Θ is
pr(X[A] ∈ dx | y= {y}) =
ν(dx)px(y)∫
Θ pθ(y)ν(dθ)
,(3.1)
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where pθ(y) is the density of Pθ at y. The finiteness condition on A ensures
that the integral in the denominator is finite, and the occurrence of an event
at y implies that Pν assigns positive mass to each open neighborhood of y.
Provided that 0 < Pν(A) <∞, this purely probabilistic conclusion may
be interpreted as a vindication of the formal Bayes calculation associated
with an improper prior. However, the two versions of Bayes’s theorem are
quite different in logical structure; one implies a single random element, the
other infinitely many. Accordingly, if a statistical procedure is to be judged
by a criterion such as a conventional loss function, which presupposes a sin-
gle observation and a single parameter, we should not expect optimal results
from a probabilistic theory that demands multiple observations and multiple
parameters. Conversely, if the procedure is to be judged by a criterion that
allows for multiple sequences each with its own parameter, we should not
expect useful results from a probabilistic theory that recognizes only one se-
quence and one parameter. Thus, the existence of a joint probability model
associated with an improper prior does not imply optimality in the form
of coherence, consistency or admissibility. For example, in the MANOVA
example of Eaton and Sudderth (1995), the Poisson point process interpre-
tation yields the classical posterior, which is incoherent in de Finetti’s sense
and is strongly inconsistent in Stone’s sense.
The observability condition implies that the restriction of Pν to A is finite,
and hence trivially σ-finite. The role of the finiteness condition is illustrated
by two examples in Sections 4 and 6. For the Gaussian model, Pν is countable
for every n ≥ 0 and σ-finite for n ≥ 2, which guarantees the existence of
a sampling region if n≥ 2. For the Bernoulli model, Pν is countable for each
n ≥ 0 but not σ-finite for any n. Nonetheless, the finiteness condition for
observability is satisfied by certain subsets A⊂ {0,1}n for n≥ 2.
4. Gaussian point process.
4.1. Parametric version. Consider the standard model for a Gaussian se-
quence with independent N(θ,σ2) components. Let p be a given real num-
ber, and let the prior measure be ν(dθ dσ) = dθ dσ/σp on the parameter
space Θ = R × R+. For all p, both ν and the joint measure on Θ × Rn
satisfy the countability condition. Consequently a Poisson point process
Z = (X,Y )⊂Θ×Rn exists in the product space. For n > 2−p, the marginal
measure Pν has a density in R
n
λn(y) =
Γ((n+ p− 2)/2)2(p−3)/2pi−(n−1)/2n−1/2
(
∑n
i=1(yi− y¯)
2)(n+p−2)/2
,(4.1)
which is finite at all points y ∈Rn except for the diagonal set. Provided that
n ≥ 2 and n > 2− p, there exists in Rn a subset A such that Pν(A)<∞,
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which serves as the region of observation. In fact, these conditions are suf-
ficient for σ-finiteness in this example. To each observation y= Y ∩A and
to each event y ∈ y, there corresponds a conditional distribution on Θ with
density
p(θ,σ | Y ∩A= y, y ∈ y) = φn(y; θ,σ)σ
−p/λn(y),
where φn(y; θ,σ) is the Gaussian density at y in R
n. The conditional distri-
bution (2.2) of the parameter subset X[A]⊂Θ given Y ∩A= y is a product
of factors of this type, one for each of the events in y. It should be empha-
sized here that the information in the conditioning event is not simply that
y⊂ Y , but also that Y contains no other events in A.
4.2. Nonparametric version. Let N be the set of natural numbers, and
let S =RN be the collection of real-valued sequences,
S =RN = {y = (y1, y2, . . .) :yi ∈R, i ∈N}
with product σ-field RN. We construct directly in this space a Poisson pro-
cess Z ⊂ S whose mean measure Λ is uniquely determined by its finite-
dimensional projections Λn with density (4.1). By their construction, these
measures are finitely exchangeable and satisfy the Kolmogorov consistency
condition Λn+1(A×R) = Λn(A) for each integer n≥ 0 and A ∈R
n. In keep-
ing with the terminology for random sequences, we say that the point pro-
cess Z ∼ PP(Λ) is infinitely exchangeable if each Λn is finitely exchange-
able.
Let S = S1 × S0, where S1 = R
n is the projection onto the first n coor-
dinates, and S0 ∼= S is the complementary projection onto the subsequent
coordinates. Each event z ∈Z is an ordered pair, so we write Z = (Y,X)⊂S
as a countable set of ordered pairs (Yi,Xi) in which the marginal process
Y ⊂ S1 is Poisson with parameter Λn, and X ∼ PP(Λ) has the same dis-
tribution as Z. Provided that the set A ⊂ S1 has finite Λn-measure, the
observation y = Y ∩ A is finite. To each event y ∈ y, there corresponds
an event z = (y,x) ∈ Z, so that y = (z1, . . . , zn) is the initial sequence,
and x = (zn+1, . . .) is the subsequent trajectory. The conditional distribu-
tion (2.2) is such that the subsequent trajectories X[A] are conditionally
independent and noninterfering given Y ∩A= y. For each event y ∈ y, the
k-dimensional joint density at x= (x1, . . . , xk) of the subsequent trajectory
is
p(dx | Y ∩A= y, y ∈ y) =
λn+k(y,x)dx
λn(y)
,(4.2)
which is the k-dimensional exchangeable Student t density [Kotz and Nadara-
jah (2004), page 1] on ν = n+ p− 2> 0 degrees of freedom.
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For any continuous location-scale model with finite pth moment and im-
proper prior density proportional to dµdσ/σp with p > 0, the initial segment
Y ⊂R2 is a Poisson process with intensity
λ2(y)∝
1
|y1 − y2|p
.
Otherwise if p≤ 0 the initial segment of length n > 2−p is a Poisson process
with intensity
λn(y)∝
1
(
∑n
i=1(yi − y¯)
2)(n+p−2)/2
.
The prescription (4.2) extends each event y ∈ Y to an infinite random se-
quence in such a way that the set of extended sequences Z ⊂RN is a Poisson
process with mean measure Λ. Given Y ⊂ R2, these extensions are condi-
tionally independent, noninterfering, and each extension is an exchangeable
sequence. In the Gaussian case, (4.2) is equivalent to the statement that each
initial sequence with sn 6= 0 is extended according to the recursive Gosset
rule
yn+1 = y¯n + snεn
√
n2 − 1
n(n+ p− 2)
,
where y¯n, s
2
n are the sample mean and variance of the first n components,
and εn ∼ tn+p−2 has independent components. The resulting extension is an
exchangeable sequence whose k-dimensional joint density at (y3, . . . , yk+2)
is λk+2(y1, . . . , yk+2)/λ2(y1, y2).
The Gosset extension is such that the sequence (y¯n, s
2
n) is Markovian
and has a limit. Given a single sequence in the sampling region, the joint
distribution of the limiting random variables (y¯∞, s∞) is
p(y¯∞, s∞ | Y ∩A= y, y ∈ y) = φn(y; y¯∞, s∞)s
−p
∞ /λn(y),
which is the posterior density on Θ as computed by the Bayes calculus with
improper prior.
5. Cauchy sequences. Consider the standard model for a Cauchy se-
quence having independent components with parameter θ ∈ R × R+. For
p > 0, the prior measure ν(dθ) = dθ1 dθ2/θ
p
2 satisfies the countability condi-
tion, which implies that a Poisson process X = (X,Y )⊂Θ×Rn with mean
measure Pν exists in the product space. If 0< p< n and n≥ 2, the marginal
measure in Rn has a density which is finite at all points y ∈Rn whose com-
ponents are distinct. The density satisfies the recurrence formula
lim
yn→±∞
piy2nλn,p(y1, . . . , yn) = λn−1,p−1(y1, . . . , yn−1).
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For integer p≥ 2, the density is
λn,p(y) =


(−1)(n−p+1)/2
pin−22n−p+1
∑
r 6=s
|ys − yr|
n−p
drds
, (n− p) odd;
(−1)(n−p)/2
pin−12n−p
∑
r 6=s
(ys − yr)
n−p log |ys − yr|
drds
,
(n− p) even;
(5.1)
where dr =
∏
t6=r(yt − yr). For example, λ2,1(y) = 1/(2|y1 − y2|) and
λ3,2(y) =
1
2pi|(y1 − y2)(y2 − y3)(y1 − y3)|
.
Spiegelhalter (1985) established the same formula for p= 1 in equation (2.2).
For n> p, there exists a subset A⊂Rn such that Λn(A)<∞, which serves
as the region of observation. The Poisson process determines a probability
distribution on finite subsets y⊂ A, and to each point y ∈ y it also associates
a conditional distribution on Θ with density
Pν(dθ× dy)
Λn(dy)
=
fn(y; θ)θ
−p
2
λn(y)
,(5.2)
where fn(y; θ) is the Cauchy density at y ∈R
n.
In the nonparametric version with Θ replaced by Rk, the conditional dis-
tribution extends each point y ∈A to a sequence (y,X) ∈ Rn+k, with con-
ditional density X ∼ λn+k(y,x)/λn(y). The extension is infinitely exchange-
able. The tail trajectory of the infinite sequence is such that, if Tk:R
k →Θ
is Cauchy-consistent, Tn+k(y,X) has a limit whose density at θ ∈Θ is (5.2).
6. Binary sequences. Consider the standard model for a Bernoulli se-
quence with parameter space Θ = (0,1). The prior measure ν(dθ) = dθ/(θ(1−
θ)) determines a Poisson process with intensity θn1(y)−1(1−θ)n0(y)−1 at (y, θ)
in the product space S1 ×Θ. Here S1 = {0,1}
n is the space of sequences of
length n, n0(y) is the number of zeros and n1(y) is the number of ones in y.
The marginal measure on the observation space is
Λn({y}) =
{
Γ(n0(y))Γ(n1(y))/Γ(n), n0(y), n1(y)> 0,
∞, otherwise,
which is countable but not σ-finite. Any subset A⊂ S1 that excludes the zero
sequence and the unit sequence has finite measure and can serve as the region
of observation. Given such a set and the observation y= Y ∩A recorded with
multiplicities, the conditional distribution (2.2) associates with each y ∈ y
the beta distribution
Pν(θ | Y ∩A= y, y ∈ y) =
θn1(y)−1(1− θ)n0(y)−1Γ(n)
Γ(n1(y))Γ(n0(y))
on the parameter space.
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As in the preceding section, we may bypass the parameter space and
proceed directly by constructing a Poisson process with mean measure Λ
in the space of infinite binary sequences. The values assigned by Λ to the
infinite zero sequence and the infinite unit sequence are not determined
by {Λn}, and can be set to any arbitrary value, finite or infinite. Regardless
of this choice, (2.2) may be used to predict the subsequent trajectory of
each of the points y = Y ∩A provided that Λn(A)<∞. In particular, the
conditional distribution of the next subsequent component is
pr(yn+1 = 1 | Y ∩A= y, y ∈ y) = n1(y)/n.
This is the standard Po´lya urn model [Durrett (2010)] for which the infi-
nite average of all subsequent components is a beta random variable with
parameters (n0(y), n1(y)), in agreement with the parametric analysis.
7. Interpretation. The point-process interpretation of an improper mea-
sure on Θ forces us to think of the parameter in a collective sense as a random
subset rather than a random point. One interpretation is that a proper prior
is designed for a specific scientific problem whose goal is the estimation of
a particular parameter about which something may be known, or informed
guesses can be made. An improper mixture is designed for a generic class of
problems, not necessarily related to one another scientifically, but all having
the same mathematical structure. Logistic regression models, which are used
for many purposes in a wide range of disciplines, are generic in this sense.
In the absence of a specific scientific context, nothing can be known about
the parameter, other than the fact that there are many scientific problems
of the same mathematical type, each associated with a different parameter
value. In that wider sense of a generic mathematical class, it is not unnatu-
ral to consider a broader framework encompassing infinitely many scientific
problems, each with its own parameter. The set of parameters is random
but not indexed in an exchangeable way.
A generic model may be tailored to a specific scientific application by
coupling it with a proper prior distribution pi that is deemed relevant to
the scientific context. If there is broad agreement about the model and the
relevance of pi to the context, subsequent calculations are uncontroversial.
Difficulties arise when no consensus can be reached about the prior. Accord-
ing to one viewpoint, each individual has a personal prior or belief; Bayes’s
theorem is then a recipe for the modification of personal beliefs [Bernardo
and Smith (1994), Chapter 2]. Another line of argument calls for a panel
of so-called experts to reach a consensus before Bayes’s theorem can be
used in a mutually agreeable fashion [Weerhandi and Zidek (1981), Genest,
McConway and Schervish (1986)]. A third option is to use proper but flat
or relatively uninformative priors. Each of these options demands a proper
prior on Θ in order that Bayes’s theorem may be used.
This paper offers a fourth option by showing that it is possible to apply
Bayes’s theorem to the generic model. Rather than forcing the panel to reach
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a proper consensus, we may settle for an improper prior as a countable sum of
proper, and perhaps mutually contradictory, priors generated by an infinite
number of experts. Although Bayes’s theorem can be used, the structure
of the theorem for an improper mixture is not the same as the structure
for a proper prior. For example, improper Bayes estimators need not be
admissible.
Finiteness of the restriction of the measure to the sampling region is
needed in our argument. If the restriction to the sampling region is σ-finite,
we may partition the region into a countable family of disjoint subsets of
finite measure, and apply the extension subset by subset. The existence of
a Poisson point process on the sampling region is assured by Kingman’s
superposition theorem. Lack of interference implies that these extensions
are mutually consistent, so there is no problem dealing with such σ-finite
restrictions. This is probably not necessary from a statistical perspective,
but it does not create any mathematical problems because the extension
does not depend on the choice of the partition of the region.
8. Marginalization paradoxes. The unBayesian characteristic of an impro-
per prior distribution is highlighted by the marginalization paradoxes discus-
sed by Stone and Dawid (1972) and by Dawid, Stone and Zidek (1973). In the
following example from Stone and Dawid (1972), the formal marginal poste-
rior distribution calculated by two methods demonstrates the inconsistency.
Example 8.1. The observation consists of two independent exponential
random variables X ∼ E(θφ) and Y ∼ E(φ), where θ and φ are unknown
parameters. The parameter of interest is the ratio θ.
Method 1. The joint density is
pr(dx, dy | θ,φ) = θφ2e−φ(θx+y) dxdy.
Given the improper prior distribution pi(θ)dθdφ, the marginal posterior dis-
tribution for θ is
pi(θ | x, y)∝
pi(θ)θ
(θx+ y)3
∝
pi(θ)θ
(θ+ z)3
,(8.1)
where z = y/x.
Method 2. Notice that the posterior distribution depends on (x, y) only
through z. For a given θ, z/θ has an F2,2 distribution, that is,
pr(z | θ)∝
θ
(θ+ z)2
.
Using the implied marginal prior pi(θ)dθ, as if it were the limit of a sequence
of proper priors, we obtain
pi(θ | z)∝
pi(θ)θ
(θ + z)2
,(8.2)
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which differs from (8.1). It has been pointed out by Dempster and in the
author’s rejoinder [Dawid, Stone and Zidek (1973)], that no choice of pi(θ)
could bring the two analyses into agreement.
From the present viewpoint, the improper prior determines a random
subset of the parameter space and a random subset of the observation
space (R+)2. Under suitable conditions on pi, the bivariate intensity
λ(x, y) = 2
∫ ∞
0
θpi(θ)dθ
(θx+ y)3
is finite on the interior of the observation space, so the bivariate process is
observable. Equation (2.2) associates with each event (x, y) the conditional
distribution (8.1) in agreement with the formal calculation by Method 1.
Each event (x, y) determines a ratio z = y/x, and the set of ratios is a Pois-
son point process in (0,∞). However, the marginal measure is such that
Λz(A) =∞ for sets of positive Lebesgue measure, and zero otherwise. This
measure is countable, but the marginal process is not observable. Thus, con-
clusion (8.2) deduced by Method 2 does not follow from (2.2), and there is
no contradiction.
Conversely, if the prior measure pi(dθ)ρ(dφ) is multiplicative with ρ(R+)<
∞ and pi locally finite, the marginal measure on the observation space is such
that
Pν({a < x/y < b})<∞
for 0< a< b <∞. Thus, the ratio z = x/y is observable, and the conditions
for Method 2 are satisfied. The point process model associates with each
ratio 0< z <∞ the conditional distribution with density
pi(θ,φ | z)∝
ρ(φ)θ
(θ + z)2
in agreement with (8.2). However, the conditional distribution given (x, y)
pi(θ,φ | (x, y))∝ θφ2e−φ(θx+y)pi(θ)ρ(φ)
is such that the marginal distribution of θ given (x, y) is not a function of z
alone. Once again, there is no conflict with (8.2).
All of the other marginalization paradoxes in Dawid, Stone and Zidek
(1973) follow the same pattern.
Jaynes (2003) asserts that “an improper pdf has meaning only as the limit
of a well-defined sequence of proper pdfs.” On this point, there seems to be
near-universal agreement, even among authors who take diametrically op-
posed views on other aspects of the marginalization paradox [Akaike (1980),
Dawid, Stone and Zidek (1973) and Wallstrom (2007)]. No condition of this
sort occurs in the point-process theory. However, a sequence of measures µn
such that µn(A)<∞, each of which assigns a conditional distribution (2.2)
to every y ∈A, may have a weak limit µn→ µ such that µ(A) =∞ for which
no conditional distribution exists.
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